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Abstract
Over the last half-century, significant innovations have occurred in the fields of embryology
and human assisted reproduction as a result of human embryo research. This dynamic and
ethically complex field is generally subject to extensive regulatory oversight. This article
examines New Zealand’s legal framework governing such research. It argues that, despite
the core legislative objective of establishing a robust and flexible framework, the current
legal regime established under the Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2004 is a
classic example of regulatory failure. While not a necessary outcome of the devolved,
principles-based regulatory scheme, this failure is primarily due to the perceived lack of
authority and independence of the statutory policymaking body established under the Act,
as well as the broader regulatory environment in which it operates. It argues that a con-
fluence of problems, including Ministerial overreach as well as a lack of transparency and
accountability on the part of decision makers, undermine the legitimacy of the current
embryo research policy. This regime not only unjustifiably prevents the conduct of valuable
embryo research, but also hinders simple quality improvement practices undertaken in the
course of ordinary IVF service provision. This article concludes that, given the significance of
embryo research as well as the associated ethical and legal challenges, the issue of embryo
research should be remitted back to Parliament to legislate directly as a matter of urgency.
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In 2004, New Zealand (NZ) enacted a specific legislative regime governing the conduct
of human assisted reproductive technology and reproductive research in the form of the
Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2004 (HART Act). Two laudable objec-
tives of the Act are securing the ‘benefits’ of assisted reproductive technology and
research for individuals and society while ensuring a protective framework (particularly
for women and children),1 as well as providing a ‘robust and flexible’ framework for
guiding human assisted reproductive technology and reproductive research.2 However,
the extent to which either objective is being met in the context of human embryo research
is debatable.
When introducing the HART Act, NZ’s parliament opted for an amalgam of rules-
based and principles-based regulation. The Act introduces certain prohibitions and
establishes a statutory Advisory Committee on Assisted Reproductive Procedures and
Human Reproductive Research (ACART).3 ACART is tasked with issuing guidelines
and providing advice in regard to human assisted reproductive procedures and human
reproductive research.4 Any advice or guidelines promulgated under the Act must be
guided by prescribed statutory principles5 and comply with statutory consultation
requirements.6 This regulatory approach of enshrining some rules in primary law, but
otherwise devolving governance and policymaking authority, seeks to enable a flexible
and responsive regulatory framework, ostensibly better suited to meeting the challenges
of rapidly evolving biomedical technologies than traditional legislative mechanisms.7
This article is solely concerned with the regulation of human reproductive research. It
is set out in three parts. First, it locates this discussion in the broader debate regarding the
moral status of embryos and the evolution of the ‘14-day rule’ widely applied in the
context of embryo research. It then outlines the significance and spectrum of embryo
research, before briefly sketching the regulatory approaches adopted by two comparator
jurisdictions, the United Kingdom and Australia. The second part describes the regula-
tory framework established by the HART Act, before critiquing the policy contained in
the Guidelines for Research on Gametes and Non-viable Embryos (Research Guide-
lines).8 The third part considers the respective roles of the Minister of Health and
ACART, highlighting a troubling pattern of obstruction and obfuscation by officials
performing statutory functions under the Act. It concludes that as a result of extensive





6. Sections 36(1), (39), (41).
7. S. Devaney, ‘Regulate to Innovate: Principles-Based Regulation of Stem Cell Research’,
Medical Law International 11 (2011), p. 53, 57.
8. NECAHR, Guidelines for Research on Gametes and Non-viable Embryos (Research
Guidelines) (1 January 2005). Available at: www.acart.health.govt.nz (accessed 23
December 2020).
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regulatory failures, a rigorous, principles-based, and transparent review of human
embryo research is essential.
Part I: Embryo research debates and the ‘14-day rule’
Although Louise Brown’s birth occurred over four decades ago, the permissible scope of
embryo research continues to be widely debated due to competing, and largely irrecon-
cilable, views regarding the moral status of human embryos. Extracorporeal embryos
challenge neat ethical and legal categorisation, falling into a metaphorical ‘gray zone,
between life and not-yet-life’.9 Ultimately, views regarding the permissibility of human
embryo research depend upon the way in which the moral status of such entities are
construed, which varies greatly in a pluralistic society.
There are several accounts as to what accords moral status to an entity. One
approach draws on Joel Feinberg’s analysis of rights whereby an entity has moral
status if it possesses rights; an entity is a rights-bearer if it possesses interests that
society is required to take seriously.10 On this account, as non-sentient, entities
without capacity for further human development via implantation, extracorporeal
embryos cannot be said to possess interests of their own, nor will they acquire
interests in the future. If this approach is adopted, extracorporeal embryos that are
not destined for implantation in a woman cannot be attributed with significant moral
status.11
Another approach is the view that what confers full moral status and moral rights on
an entity is membership in the human community.12 On this account, all human beings
possess full moral status and moral rights.13 The question that logically follows is when
does a human being come into existence? For those who consider that a human being
comes into existence at the point of fertilisation, an extracorporeal embryo has full moral
status, and therefore destructive embryo research is morally wrong.14 A necessary impli-
cation of this view is that if IVF was to be morally acceptable, it would require that every
embryo created is implanted for the purpose of gestation to confer a chance of life on all
9. S. Jasanoff and I. Metzler, ‘Borderlands of Life: IVF Embryos and the Law in the United
States, United Kingdom, and Germany’, Science, Technology & Human Values (2018), p. 3.
10. B. Steinbock, ‘Moral Status, Moral Value and Human Embryos: Implications for Stem Cell
Research’, in B. Steinbock, ed., The Oxford Handbook of Bioethics (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2007), p. 428, citing J. Feinberg, ‘The Rights of Animals and Unborn
Generations’, in W. Blackstone, ed., Philosophy & Environmental Crisis (Athens:
University of Georgia Press, 1974).
11. Op. cit., p. 430.
12. Op. cit.
13. Op. cit.
14. R. George and C. Tollefsen, Embryo: A Defense of Human Life (New York: Doubleday,
2008); George and Toleffson argue that an embryo is a human individual in the earliest stage
of natural development because an early embryo is a human being on a developmental
continuum that will, if all goes well, result in a born human being. This constitutes an
argument of ‘biological continuity’, a human embryo is (not potentially is) an individual
human being.
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embryos.15 Such a mandatory transfer rule was initially adopted in Italian legislation,16
but did not withstand constitutional challenge.17 In contemporary times, any proposed
law that prioritised an ex vivo embryo’s chance of life over a woman’s right to make
medical decisions would not be considered a serious proposition. Rather, the reality that
IVF may result in the creation and subsequent destruction of surplus embryos has
generally been considered an acceptable trade-off in assisted reproduction. However,
for a minority who hold the full moral status view, IVF itself is morally wrong because it
necessarily involves the creation, manipulation and destruction of human embryos.18
While some scholars, particularly those writing in the natural law tradition, might
argue that at the point of fertilisation an embryo is the equivalent of a born human being,
it is not a widely shared view. Even some commentators who consider embryos to be part
of the human community do not consider that embryos should be attributed with the
same moral status as a born human being, particularly in the very early stages postferti-
lisation when the embryo constitutes a cluster of ‘undifferentiated cells’.19 On this so-
called gradualist account, moral status is perceived as something that gradually develops
and compounds over time.20 Hence, research on early-stage embryos may be morally
permissible if it is offset by benefits accrued from conducting such research. In contrast
to this intermediate or gradualist position, those at the very liberal end of the research
spectrum consider that embryos are neither persons nor potential persons, hence they
should not be afforded protected status. On this account, if research may yield beneficial
results, it should be permitted.21 What may ultimately be concluded is that there is a
spectrum of views, reasonably held, regarding the moral status of extracorporeal
embryos. Negotiating this ethical pluralism is particularly challenging for regulators
tasked with determining the permissibility of embryo research.
The evolution and codification of the ‘14-day rule’ internationally
One of the first jurisdictions to address the permissibility of embryo research was the
United Kingdom. Following Louise Brown’s birth, the UK Government appointed a
Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology in 1982, chaired by
15. Warnock Committee, Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and
Embryology (United Kingdom: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1984), para 11.9.
16. Law. 40/2004, Article 14(2).
17. Decision n. 151/2009 of the Constitutional Court. See L. Benagiano and L. Gianaroli, ‘The
Italian Constitutional Court Modifies Italian Legislation on Assisted Reproduction
Technology’, Reproductive BioMedicine Online 20 (2010), p. 398.
18. Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith Instruction on Respect for Human Life at its Origins
and on the Dignity of Procreation: Replies to Certain Questions of the Day (Donum Vitae)
(Rome: Vatican, 1987); Congregation of the Doctrine of Faith Instruction on Certain
Bioethical Questions (Dignitas Personae) (Vatican, Rome, 2008).
19. D. De Grazia, Creation Ethics, Reproduction, Genetics and Quality of Life (Oxford-New
York: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 22.
20. Warnock, para 11.17.
21. Warnock, para 11.15.
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Dame (now Baroness) Mary Warnock.22 Although a philosopher, Warnock considered
that philosophy had a limited role in determining law and policy; when it came to making
law, the two relevant questions were ‘when does life begin to matter morally’ and
‘should we permit research upon human embryos?’23 In this way, instead of acting as
‘moral’ experts, the Committee perceived its role as seeking a ‘middle way’ between
competing interests.24
When making its final recommendations the Warnock Committee drew on the exper-
tise of developmental biologists.25 The Committee heard evidence that it is generally
14 days after fertilisation that the so-called primitive streak begins to appear, which
forms the antecedents of the spinal cord and nervous system. The formation of the
primitive streak marks the beginning of individual development and was claimed to
constitute an appropriate boundary-marker for permissible and non-permissible
research.26 Ultimately, the Warnock Committee recommended that embryo research
should be permitted, but only on embryos less than 14-days postfertilisation. In this
way, the rule was pragmatic; it would retain many benefits of embryo research, while
offending as few people as possible.27 However, the Committee concluded that the
human embryo had a ‘special’ status, respect for which justified some degree of legal
protection and oversight.28
For some, the view that the embryo does not have full moral status, but yet should be
accorded ‘special status’, is incoherent.29 However, the view that embryos do not have
(full) moral status should not be conflated with the idea that embryos lack moral value.
Bonnie Steinbock argues that an entity has ‘moral value if there are moral reasons to treat
it in certain ways and not in others’.30 For example, even though a dead human body no
longer has moral status, certain moral standards must be observed in the handling of dead
bodies. Specifically, the criminal law prohibits the disrespect of human remains.31
Arguably, dead bodies demand respect because they are symbolic of human life and the
prior individual it represents. Similarly, human embryos may be thought to deserve
22. Warnock, para 1.2.
23. D. Wilson, The Making of British Bioethics (Manchester, Manchester University Press,
2014), pp. 141 and 160–171.
24. Op. cit., p. 141.
25. D. Wilson, ‘Where to Draw the Line: Mary Warnock, Embryos and Moral Expertise’ in D.
Wilson, ed., The Making of British Bioethics ((Manchester: Manchester University Press,
2014).
26. A. Alichniewicz, ‘The Ontological and Moral Status of the Human Embryo’, in A.
Alichniewicz and M. Michalowska, eds., Medicine of the Beginning of Life (Warsaw:
Oficyna Naukawa, 2019).
27. Wilson, Bioethics, pp. 140–186.
28. Warnock, para 11.7.
29. E. Jackson, ‘Fraudulent Stem Cell Research and Respect for the Embryo’, BioSocieties 1(3)
(2006), pp. 349–356.
30. Steinbock, ‘Moral Status’, p. 433.
31. Section 150(b) of the Crimes Act 1961 makes it an offence to ‘improperly or indecently
interfere[] with or offer[] any indignity to any dead human body or human remains’.
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respect because they are ‘a symbol of human existence’.32 While embryos may not be
rights bearers or moral subjects nor are they nothing.33
The ‘14-day rule’ was subsequently codified by the United Kingdom’s Human Ferti-
lisation and Embryology Act 1990 (HFE Act). It constitutes a pragmatic compromise
that enables beneficial research to be conducted, while imposing limits on the use of
extracorporeal embryos.34 This 14-day rule has since been adopted in at least 12 coun-
tries, including New Zealand’s HART Act.35 Despite recent challenges that the rule is
too conservative,36 it is viewed by many as the ‘linchpin of an effective policy compro-
mise between what remain deeply divided moral positions on the human embryo’s
status’.37 For those jurisdictions that have adopted the 14-day rule, the nature of research
that may be conducted on embryos less than 14-days postfertilisation varies.
The significance and spectrum of human embryo research
There is a wide spectrum of embryo research, as well as a range of embryos that could,
theoretically, be used in such research. Embryo research may be performed to improve
knowledge about infertility and to develop more effective ART techniques.38 Alterna-
tively, embryo research may focus on understanding early developmental biology,39 or
on identifying causes for, and treatment of, serious diseases and other serious medical
conditions,40 or to develop methods for detecting gene, chromosome or mitochondrial
abnormalities in embryos prior to implantation.41 Embryos may also be used to derive
stem cells for research into disease and the development of regenerative therapies.42
More recent developments, although still subject to considerable debate, include
32. Steinbock, ‘Moral Status’, p. 436.
33. J. Robertson, ‘In the Beginning: The Legal Status of Early Embryos’, Virginia Law Review
76(3) (1990), p. 447.
34. M. Brazier, ‘Regulating the Reproduction Business?’ Medical Law Review 7 (1999), pp. 166,
174.
35. I. Hyun, A. Wilkerson and J. Johnston, ‘Embryology Policy: Revisit the 14-day Rule’,
Nature 533 (2016), pp. 169–171.
36. J. Appleby and A. Bredenoord, ‘Should the 14-day Rule for Embryo Research Become the
28-day Rule?’, EMBO Molecular Medicine 10(9) (2018), p. e9437; Nuffield Council on
Bioethics, Human Embryo Culture (London, 2017).
37. S. Chan, ‘How to Rethink the Fourteen-day Rule’, Hastings Center Report 47(3) (2017), p. 5.
38. M. Shahbazi et al., ‘Self-organization of the Human Embryo in the Absence of Maternal
Tissues’, Nature Cell Biology 18 (2016), pp. 700–708.
39. K. Niakan et al., ‘Human Pre-implantation Embryo Development’, Development 139 (2012),
pp. 829–841.
40. I. Ben-Nun and N. Benvenisty, ‘Human Embryonic Stem Cells as Cellular Models for
Human Disorders’, Molecular and Cellular Endocrinology 252 (2006), pp. 154-159
41. S. Kahrarnan et al., ‘Recent Advances in Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis’, Advances in
Genomics and Genetics 5 (2015), p. 189. See HFE Act, sch. 2 para 3A(2).
42. L. da Cruz et al., ‘Phase 1 Clinical Study of an Embryonic Stem Cell-Derived Retinal
Pigment Epithelium Patch in Age-related Macular Degeneration’, Nature Biotechnology
36 (2018), pp. 328.
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research into mitochondrial replacement therapy43 as well as embryonic gene editing.44
Predicted research developments include stem cell-derived gametes and embryos.45
As well as the wide range of possible research, various kinds of embryos may, at least
theoretically, be used for research. Research may be performed on ‘non-viable’ embryos
that will otherwise be discarded as unsuitable for implantation, as well as ‘surplus’
embryos that are no longer required by an individual/couple following IVF. Additional
sources of embryos include those specifically created for research purposes, created
using ordinary IVF procedures or by using cloning techniques such as somatic cell
nuclear transfer (SCNT). Another source of embryos involves hybrid embryos (embryos
containing both human and non-human DNA).
Before considering New Zealand’s ostensibly decentred regulatory framework,46 the
following briefly outlines the regulatory positions adopted in the United Kingdom and in
Australian federal law.
Embryo research: United Kingdom and Australia
The UK’s Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (HFE Act) as amended in 2008
expressly prohibits certain activities and establishes an independent arm’s length regula-
tory authority, the Human Fertilisation & Embryology Authority (HFEA), to operationa-
lise the law.47 While the HFEA is responsible for licensing treatment and research,48 the
HFE Act specifies the purposes for which embryo research may be licenced49 and iden-
tifies permissible sources of embryos for research.50 The HFEA is responsible for for-
mulating a Code of Practice governing the conduct of assisted conception treatment and
research.51 It is also tasked with advising the public and Government regarding scientific
advances, evaluating such developments, and associated decision-making.52
The HFE Act permits research on embryos less than 14 days old, subject to licensing
by the HFEA.53 It facilitates a wide scope of research, including the creation of embryos
for research purposes, but distinguishes between ‘permitted’ embryos that may be used
to establish a pregnancy, and embryos that may only be used for research purposes and
43. I. Cohen et al., ‘The Regulation of Mitochondrial Replacement Techniques around the
World’, Annual Review of Genomics and Human Genetics 21 (2020), p. 565.
44. National Academy of Sciences, Heritable Human Genome Editing (Washington, DC: The
National Academies Press, 2020).
45. I. Moreno, J. Miguez-Forhan and C. Simon, ‘Artificial Gametes from Stem Cells’, Clinical
and Experimental Reproductive Medicine 42 (2015), p. 33.
46. J. Black, ‘Regulation as Facilitation: Negotiating the Genetic Revolution’, The Modern Law
Review 61(5) (1998), pp. 621–660.
47. HFE Act, section 5, schedule 1.
48. Section 11.
49. HFE Act, sch. 2 paras 3–3A.
50. HFE Act, sch. 2 para 3(1)(a) and sch. 2 para 3(3)(a).
51. Section 25.
52. HFE Act, s 8.
53. Sections 3(1), 3(3)(a).
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not implanted.54 The Act outlines the principal purposes for which embryo research may
be licenced by the HFEA, provided it is satisfied that the research is necessary and
desirable for those purposes,55 or for such other purposes as may be specified in regu-
lations.56 Specified purposes include increasing knowledge about, and treatments for,
serious disease or medical conditions; promoting advances in the treatment of infertility;
increasing knowledge of the causes of congenital disease and miscarriage; developing
methods for detection of gene or chromosomal abnormalities in pre-implantation
embryos; and increasing knowledge about the development of embryos.57
Embryo research in Australia is regulated at the federal level by the Research Involv-
ing Human Embryos Act 2002 (RIHE Act) and the Prohibition of Human Cloning for
Reproduction Act 2002 (PHCR Act). The RIHE Act adopts a licensing system in con-
junction with the National Health and Medical Research Council’s (NHMRC) National
Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research 2007 (Updated 2018).58 As in the
United Kingdom, the RIHE Act precludes licences being given for any use that would
result in embryo development beyond 14 days.59
The RIHE Act permits the use of donated excess IVF embryos in research, provided
consent is obtained from the donors, and the research is authorised by a licence issued by
the Embryo Research Licensing Committee of the NHMRC,60 but does not permit the
creation of IVF embryos for research purposes.61 However, following the Government-
appointed Lockhart review in 2005, the permissible scope of embryo research in Australia
was expanded to include use of human embryos created other than by other than by
fertilisation (such as by SCNT) or the use of hybrid embryos for research purposes.62
Such research is permissible provided a licence authorising the creation or development,63
and subsequent research use,64 of those embryos is obtained. The NHMRC Ethical
54. Sections 3(2), 3ZA.
55. HFE Act 1990, schedule 2, para 3, 3A(1) and 3A(2). For a discussion, see E. Jackson,
Medical Law: Text, Cases, and Materials. 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2013), p. 648.
56. HFE Act, Sched 2, 3A(1)(c).
57. HFE Act, Sched 2, para 3A.
58. RIHE Act, pt. 2; NHMRC, National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research 2007
(Updated 2018) (Canberra, 2018).
59. RIHE Act, section 20(1A).
60. RIHE Act, section 10(1)(b), (2). The Licensing Committee must be satisfied that the research
proposed has been assessed and approved by a Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC)
acting consistently with the NHMRC National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human
Research (2018) and the NHMRC, Ethical Guidelines on the Use of Assisted
Reproductive Technology in Clinical Practice and Research (Canberra: NHMRC, 2017).
61. RIHE, section 11.
62. Australian Government, Legislation Review: Prohibition of Human Cloning Act 2002 and
Research Involving Human Embryos Act 2002 (Canberra, 2005).
63. The PHRC Act permits the creation of a human embryo other than by fertilisation subject to
authorisation by licence (section 22); section 23B of the PHRC Act prohibits the creation of a
hybrid embryo unless a licence has been issued under section 21 of the RIHE Act.
64. RIHE Act, section 10A.
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Guidelines provide criteria that proposed research must satisfy, including: ‘sufficient evi-
dence that the likely benefits of the proposed research cannot be achieved without using
human embryos’; there is proof of concept; and the research is ‘justifiable by its potential
benefit in improving technologies for treatment of, or knowledge about, human diseases’.65
A feature of both the UK and Australian regimes is that they proscribe certain
activities in statute, but otherwise facilitate embryo research, subject to extensive licen-
sing systems. In both jurisdictions, approval for embryo research requires justification
that conducting the research is necessary or desirable to achieve potential health benefits.
Also notable is the significant attention that embryo research has received in both the
United Kingdom and Australia from legislators, policymakers and academics. In Aus-
tralia, the federal Government has undertaken several reviews of embryo research.66 In
the United Kingdom, multiple actors have engaged with issues in embryo research, in
addition to the Government.67 For example, prior to the recent introduction of regula-
tions permitting mitochondrial replacement therapy,68 the HFEA commissioned an
expert panel to undertake scientific review of its safety and efficacy, which was updated
over several years,69 as well as conducting a public consultation.70 In addition, the issue
was subjected to independent ethical scrutiny by the Nuffield Council on Bioethics.71
65. NHMRC, Ethical Guidelines, para 13.3.
66. Legislation Review Committee, Parliament of Australia, Legislation Review: Prohibition of
Human Cloning Act 2002 and Research Involving Human Embryos Act 2002 (2005);
Legislation Review Committee, Parliament of Australia, Legislation Review: Prohibition
of Human Cloning Act 2002 and Research Involving Human Embryos Act 2002 (Canberra,
2011); Australian Senate Community Affairs References Committee, Science of
Mitochondrial Donation and Related Matters (Australia: Commonwealth of Australia,
2018).
67. House of Commons Science and Technology Committee, Inquiry into Human Reproductive
Technologies and the Law (Fifth Report of session 2004-2005, HC 7-1) (London: HMSO);
House of Commons Science and Technology Committee Government, Proposals for the
Regulation of Hybrid and Chimera Embryo’s (Fifth Report of session 2006-2007, HC 272-1)
(London: HMSO).
68. Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Mitochondrial Donation) Regulations 2015.
69. Review Panel, Scientific Review of the Safety and Efficacy of Methods to Avoid
Mitochondrial Disease through Assisted Conception (London: Report to the HFEA,
2011); Review Panel, Third Scientific Review of the Safety and Efficacy of methods to
Avoid Mitochondrial Disease through Assisted Conception: 2014 update (London: Report
to the HFEA, 2013); Review Panel, Review of the Safety and Efficacy of Polar Body Transfer
to avoid Mitochondrial Disease: Addendum to ‘Third Scientific Review of the Safety and
Efficacy of methods to Avoid Mitochondrial Disease through Assisted Conception: 2014
Update. (London: Report to the HFEA, 2014); Review Panel, Scientific Review of the Safety
and Efficacy of Methods to avoid Mitochondrial Disease through Assisted Conception: 2016
Update (London: Report to the HFEA, 2016).
70. See HFEA (2013), Mitochondria Replacement Consultation: Advice to Government.
Available at: www.hfea.gov.uk (accessed 23 December 2020).
71. Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Novel Techniques for the Prevention of Mitochondrial DNA
Disorders (London: Nuffield Council, 2012).
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Having established these two jurisdictions as relevant comparators, the following
outlines the regulatory framework established by NZ’s HART Act, before examining
the regulatory regime governing embryo research
Part II: NZ’s regulatory framework
When the NZ Parliament introduced the HART Act it opted for a hybrid – rules-based
and principles-based – legal regime. Apart from creating a set of prohibited offences, it
delegates authority to the statutory Advisory Committee on Assisted Reproductive
Technology and Reproductive Research (ACART) to issue guidelines and provide
advice in regard to human ‘assisted reproductive procedures’ (ARPs),72 ‘established
procedures’73 and ‘human reproductive research’ (HRR).74 When formulating advice
and guidelines, ACART must be guided by specific statutory principles and provisions,
including mandatory consultation obligations.75
The HART Act establishes a two-tier system, distinguishing policymaking processes
from approval processes. The Act confers authority on ACART to issue guidelines and
give advice to both the Minister and the Ethics Committee on Assisted Reproductive
Technology (ECART).76 ECART is authorised to consider actual applications to per-
form ‘ARPs’ and ‘HRR’.77
The purpose and principles contained in the Act signal Parliament’s intentions when
introducing the HART Act, and the values that underpin it. At first glance, these suggest
a relatively liberal framework was intended.
A ‘robust and flexible framework’, and principles for policymaking
The first purpose declared in the Act is to ‘secure the benefits’ of ART and ‘HRR’ for
individuals and society by taking ‘appropriate measures’ to protect and promote the
‘health, safety, dignity, and rights of all individuals, but particularly those of women
and children, in the use of these procedures and research’.78 An additional purpose is to
prohibit ‘unacceptable assisted reproductive procedures and . . . research’.79 Of greatest
72. ‘ARP’ is defined in section 5(a) as ‘a procedure performed for the purpose of assisting human
reproduction that involves— (i) the creation of an in vitro human embryo; or (ii) the storage,
manipulation, or use of an in vitro human gamete or an in vitro human embryo; or (iii) the use
of cells derived from an in vitro human embryo; or (iv) the implantation into a human being
of human gametes or human embryos; but (b) does not include an established procedure’.
73. ‘Established procedure’ is defined in section 5 as ‘any procedure, treatment, or application
declared to be an established procedure under section 6’. An ‘established procedure’ does not
need ethical approval—it is a routine clinical procedure. See section 3(e).
74. ‘HRR’ is defined in section 5 as ‘research that uses or creates a human gamete, a human
embryo, or a hybrid embryo’.
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significance to this discussion are the following two purposes: the first is to ‘provide a
robust and flexible framework for regulating and guiding . . . assisted reproductive pro-
cedures and . . . human reproductive research’ and to prohibit the performance of non-
established ‘ARPs’ and ‘HRR’ without ethics committee approval.80 Hence in addition
to ACART, the Act establishes a statutory ethics committee (ECART). By expressly
prohibiting some aspects of ART and ‘HRR’ in legislation, while also conferring policy-
making authority on a statutory body, Parliament sought to ensure a flexible framework
that could be responsive to the technical and fast-paced field of reproductive technology
and medicine.
As noted above, the HART Act expressly adopts the ‘14-day rule’ in regard to ‘HRR’.81
Thus, it is an offence to intentionally do anything to cause the further development of an
embryo beyond 14 days; or to possess it with a view to using it in research; or to use it for
research or reproductive purposes.82 In addition, schedule 1 of the Act also provides a list
of prohibited research activities. However, schedule 1 only includes clinical research,
meaning research involving an attempt to achieve an actual pregnancy. While the schedule
addresses controversial activities such as cloning and genetic modification of embryos, it is
only the implantation of gametes or embryos in a human being or an animal following such
procedures that is prohibited. These prohibitions do not extend to lab-based or ‘non-
clinical’ research not involving implantation in a human being or animal. In this way,
Parliament deliberately chose not to foreclose the possibility of allowing such ‘non-clin-
ical’ research to be undertaken should ACART choose to permit it. In this respect, it is
significant that NZ departed from the more restrictive approach taken in the equivalent
Canadian Act, on which some provisions of the HART Act were modelled.83
Although the HART Act does not impose express restrictions on pure (i.e. ‘non-
clinical’) research involving human embryos less than 14 days postfertilisation, such
research is not simply left unregulated. Rather, it may only be conducted if written
approval has been obtained from the statutory ethics committee – ECART.84
Significantly, ECART may only approve applications to conduct proposed ‘HRR’ if
satisfied that an application is consistent with the relevant guidelines, or advice, made by
ACART.85 If there are no guidelines governing the particular procedure proposed,
ECART cannot approve applications.86 Further, it is an offence to conduct human
embryo research without prior written approval from ECART, with a fine imposed for
breach.87 In addition, every provider and person who is responsible for embryo research
80. Sections 3(d)–3(e).
81. Section 9.
82. Section 9(2). Any person who breaches this provision is liable, on conviction, to
imprisonment for up to 2 years and/or to a fine of up to NZD$100,000. HART Act,
section 9(5).




87. Section 5 of the HART Act defines ‘HRR’ as ‘research that uses or creates a human gamete, a
human embryo, or a hybrid embryo’. Section 16(1) provides that ‘HRR’ may only proceed
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that has been approved by ECART is required to take ‘all practicable steps’ to ensure that
the statutory 14-day prohibition is not contravened.88 Although ECART is responsible
for vetting applications to perform ‘HRR’, it is not responsible for creating policies
governing ‘HRR’, a responsibility which lies solely with ACART.
In summary, while the ‘14-day rule’ serves as the legal demarcation for when human
embryo research is absolutely prohibited under the Act, what constitutes permissible
research involving embryos less than 14 days postfertilisation and which does not
involve the specifically prohibited procedures is delegated to ACART to determine in
accordance with the relevant statutory provisions. Given the wide scope of delegated
decision-making authority, the Act also provides a set of principles to guide persons
exercising powers, or performing functions, under the Act.89
The HART Act’s guiding principles
The first principle is that ‘the health and well-being of children born as a result of the
performance of an assisted reproductive procedure . . . should be an important consider-
ation in all decisions about that procedure’.90 The following principle states that ‘the
human health, safety, and dignity of [both] present and future generations should be
preserved and promoted’.91 The next principle, drawn directly from the comparative
Canadian Act,92 provides that
while all persons are affected by assisted reproductive procedures and established proce-
dures, women, more than men, are directly and significantly affected by their application,
and the health and well-being of women must be protected in the use of these procedures.93
The subsequent principles provide that ‘no assisted reproductive procedure . . . [or]
research should be conducted on an individual unless . . . informed consent [has been
obtained]’.94 An additional principle acknowledges the importance of respecting Māori
cultural practices, providing that ‘the needs, values, and beliefs of Māori should be
considered and treated with respect’.95 The last principle states that ‘the different ethical,
spiritual, and cultural perspectives in society should be considered and treated with
respect’.96 These principles are relevant to ACART when performing functions under
with prior written approval of the ethics committee. Breach of this provision attracts a fine of
up to NZD$50,000. Section 16(2).





92. Assisted Human Reproduction Act SC c. 2, section 2(c).
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the Act, such as issuing guidelines and providing advice. The following outlines the
origins of the currently applied guidelines governing ‘HRR’ in NZ.
Provenance of the research guidelines
Prior to the introduction of the HART Act, the ministerial National Ethics Committee on
Assisted Human Reproduction (NECAHR), first established in 1995,97 was responsible for
assessing applications to perform new assisted reproductive procedures and research, pro-
vided advice to the Minister of Health, and developed guidelines for fertility providers on
ethical issues relating to assisted reproduction. Fertility services were not legally required to
bring proposals before NECAHR, although it was required by their professional body.98
In its 2002 Annual Report to the Minister, NECAHR noted that it had received
applications relating to the use of ‘viable’ embryos in research.99 Although it had
previously approved the use of ‘non-viable’ embryos (referred to as ‘those unsuitable
for implanting’), it considered the research use of ‘potentially healthy’ embryos attracted
significant policy and ethical issues and was likely to be of public interest.100 NECAHR
deferred the applications until it could consider these wider issues and consult with the
Minister of Health. Given the pending legislation, it did not wish to ‘pre-empt govern-
ment policy in this area by approving applications that would be inconsistent with the
direction of the legislation’.101
Given this reticence, it is curious that, with the approval of the Minister of Health,
NECAHR published guidelines on embryo research in January 2005, after the introduc-
tion of the HART Act. The NECAHR Guidelines for Research on Gametes and Non-
viable Embryos Research Guidelines (Research Guidelines) are notable in that they
make no reference to the HART Act, its purposes or its principles.102 The NECAHR
Research Guidelines were subsequently elevated from their ethical status to a legal status
under transitional provisions contained in the HART Act.103
NECAHR research guidelines: Designated ‘interim’ ACART research guidelines
Under transitional provisions provided in the Act, the Minister of Health may require an
ethics committee to treat specified provisions of any document as interim guidelines
97. NECAHR, initially established by the Minister of Health under section 46 of the Health and
Disability Services Act 1993, was subsequently established as a ministerial committee
under section 11 of the New Zealand Public Health and Disability Act 2000.
98. Their professional body, the Fertility Society of Australia and New Zealand, required
fertility clinics to gain ethical approval as part of the accreditation requirements imposed
by the Reproductive Technology Accreditation Committee.
99. NECAHR, Annual Report to the Minister of Health for the Year Ending 31 December 2002
(Wellington, Ministry of Health, June 2003), p. i.
100. Op. cit.
101. Op. cit.
102. NECAHR, Guidelines for Research on Gametes and Non-viable Embryos Research
Guidelines (Wellington, Ministry of Health, 2005).
103. Section 83.
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issued by ACART for the purposes of the Act at any time during the 3 years after the date
on which the Act gained Royal assent.104 In August 2005, the Minister of Health
approved a tranche of guidelines promulgated by NECAHR, including NECAHR’s
Research Guidelines, as interim ACART guidelines, under the Act.105
In accordance with the HART Act, the notice published in the New Zealand Gazette
states that the Research Guidelines are effective until 21 November 2007 (3 years after
the Act received Royal assent), unless revoked sooner.106 This indicates an expectation
that the interim guidelines would be revised once ACART was established. As this has
not occurred, the Research Guidelines have not been effective legally since 2007. If NZ
has no legally effective guidelines governing embryo research, ECART does not have
legal authority to approve any applications to conduct any embryo research whatsoever.
Despite this, the Research Guidelines continue to be treated as legally effective by both
ACART and ECART. Given this, the following section considers the substantive content
of the Research Guidelines.
A critique of the Guidelines for Research on Gametes and Non-viable Embryos
The Research Guidelines simply contain a selective ‘cut and paste’ from the 2004
version of the Australian National Health and Medical Research Council’s Ethical
Guidelines on the Use of Assisted Reproductive Technology in Clinical Practice and
Research (NHMRC Guidelines).107 Because these guidelines originated from NECAHR,
a Ministerial ethics committee, they were not professionally drafted or subject to the
oversight that delegated legislation may receive.108
Significantly, even though the full title of the Guidelines for Research on Gametes
and Non-viable Embryos Research Guidelines refers to ‘non-viable’ embryos, no defi-
nition is provided as to what constitutes ‘non-viable’. However, given its prior exchange
with the Minister, it is likely that NECAHR intended to narrowly restrict the scope of
permissible research to research involving embryos ‘unsuitable for implanting’.109
The first sentence acknowledges that all of the clauses contained in the Research
Guidelines are derived from the Australian NHMRC Guidelines. However, these clauses
are selectively extracted from a broader section in the NHMRC document, with no
commentary or explanatory notes provided. This ‘cut and paste’ is problematic. The
Australian NHMRC Guidelines specify requirements for research using not only human
104. Section 83(2). The Act also specifies that requirements which are issued, amended or
revoked under subsection (2) should be published in the New Zealand Gazette. Section
83(6).
105. ‘Approval of Interim Guidelines Under the Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Act
2004’ (11 August 2005) 123 New Zealand Gazette 2965, p. 3010.
106. ‘Approval of Interim Guidelines’, p. 3010.
107. NHMRC, Ethical Guidelines on the Use of Assisted Reproductive Technology in Clinical
Practice and Research (2004), cls. 15.4-15.6, 15.8, 15.10–15.12 and 16.3–16.6.
108. D. McGee, Parliamentary Practice in New Zealand. M. Harris and D. Wilson, eds. 4th ed.
(Auckland: Oratia Books, 2017), p. 459.
109. NECAHR, Annual Report, p. i.
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gametes and ‘non-viable’ embryos but also encompasses two further categories of
embryo research: research involving ‘viable’ embryos (embryos that are intended to
be transferred to a woman)110 and research involving ‘excess’ IVF embryos (embryos
no longer needed by a couple/individual in an IVF programme and subsequently donated
to research).111
Clause 15 of the NHMRC Guidelines provides generic ethical principles for research,
expressly including both clinical and ‘non-clinical’ research. Clause 16 provides specific
principles for research involving gametes, while clause 17 pertains to research involving
embryos (‘viable’, ‘non-viable’ and ‘excess’ embryos).
The NZ Research Guidelines consist of specific provisions extracted from clauses
15 and 16 of the Australian NHMRC’s guidelines. However, the NZ Research
Guidelines clauses do not distinguish between research involving gametes and
research involving embryos. Somewhat problematically, the NZ Research Guide-
lines refer to clinical research that results in a pregnancy, despite the fact that ‘non-
viable’ embryos, by their very nature, would never be used in clinical care. These
generic provisions refer to researchers’ obligations to minimise risks in research
involving clinical care, including that they must ‘ensure that any risks of adverse
effects to any subsequently created embryo (or to the long-term health of any person
born as a result of use of the embryo to achieve a pregnancy) are minimal’.112 This
clause is confusing – given that the title of the guidelines restricts research to use of
‘non-viable’ embryos.
Additional clauses require researchers to keep records, including records of all
‘gametes and embryos in their care’ and to ‘assess, evaluate and monitor outcomes for
all participants (including any persons conceived using reproductive procedures, their
siblings, where relevant, and the gamete or embryo donors)’.113 Neither of these provi-
sions are restricted solely to gametes and arguably presuppose the use of ‘viable’
embryos in research. Finally, the Research Guidelines contain a clause enabling con-
scientious objection.114 This latter clause is strange – given that it would seem to be most
applicable to the use of ‘viable’ embryos in research rather than gametes and ‘non-
viable’ embryos. In this way, the guidelines lack clarity and coherence.
110. The NHMRC’s Ethical Guidelines state at cl. 17 that ‘[r]esearch on embryos intended for
transfer to a woman to achieve a pregnancy may be undertaken either to trial a new
procedure that is expected to bring benefits to the embryo concerned (such as a trial to
compare two culture media) or to advance knowledge without direct benefit to the embryo
(such as microscopic observation of the embryo during its development before transfer to
the woman)’.
111. The NHMRC’s Ethical Guidelines provide at cl. 17.12 that ‘[r]esearchers must not
approach persons responsible for the embryos for consent to use their embryo in a
specified research project until after a decision has been made, and confirmed in writing,
by all persons responsible for the embryo that it is no longer needed for reproductive
treatment and that it is therefore an excess ART embryo (as defined by the RIHE Act . . . )’.
112. NECAHR, Research Guidelines, cl. 16.4.
113. NECAHR, Research Guidelines, cls. 15.8 and 15.10.
114. Clause 15.12.
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Implications of the ‘interim’ Research Guidelines
As noted above, before a researcher may lawfully conduct ‘HRR’, they must obtain
written ethical approval from ECART.115 ECART may only approve an application if it
is consistent with ACART’s guidelines.116 Therefore, ECART may only approve
embryo research applications involving ‘non-viable’ embryos.
Distinct problems arise from restricting research solely to ‘non-viable’ embryos. The
first is definitional. Although not defined, it is likely that ‘non-viable’ is meant to denote
embryos that are not likely to implant due to poor morphological qualities or that have
been diagnosed by pre-implantation genetic diagnosis as carrying serious genetic muta-
tions and therefore deemed ‘unsuitable for implantation’. Yet, it may also be argued that
any embryo that is not destined for implantation, whether due to poor morphology or
because of a choice made by its progenitors not to implant it, may be considered to be
‘non-viable’ because it is not on a trajectory of implantation and potential foetal
development.
A different issue arising from restricting research to ‘non-viable’ embryos is that
it may limit the generalisability of any research results. Although it is not suggested
that ‘non-viable’ embryos are of no value to research, the majority of embryo
research requires the study of healthy embryos.117 An additional issue is that lim-
iting research to ‘non-viable’ embryos narrows the options available for individuals,
in particular women, who must make decisions regarding disposition of their ‘sur-
plus’ embryos.
It is not uncommon for couples to be left with embryos that are ‘surplus’ to their
reproductive requirements, for various reasons, following IVF. They may have com-
pleted their family or may no longer want to pursue IVF. ‘Excess’ embryos cannot be
cryopreserved indefinitely; the HART Act imposes a 10-year limit on storage, at which
point a decision must be made regarding embryo disposition.118 For some, donating their
‘excess’ embryos to research, rather than having them destroyed or donated to another
couple, may be preferable.119 While in Australia and the United Kingdom, couples or
individuals may donate their ‘surplus’ or ‘excess’ embryos to research this is not an
option in NZ. Under the Research Guidelines, ECART is unable to consider any pro-
posed research involving ‘surplus’ donated embryos. By default, such research is imper-
missible under the HART Act. Consequently, the choice of embryo disposition is denied
to the very individuals who have expended significant emotional, physical and financial
labour in their creation.
Although no justification was provided for this, scholars elsewhere have argued that
limiting research to ‘non-viable’ embryos may allay the concerns of those individuals
115. HART Act, section 16(1).
116. HART Act, section 18(2).
117. Compare F. Baylis, ‘Embryological Viability’, American Journal of Bioethics 5(6) (2005),
pp. 17–18.
118. Section 10.
119. S. Goedeke et al., ‘The Fate of Unused Embryos: Discourses, Action Possibilities, and
Subject Positions’, Qualitative Health Research 27(10) (2017), p. 1533.
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who would ascribe full moral status to the embryo.120 However, this approach is proble-
matic. First, by preventing the use of ‘surplus’ ‘viable’ embryos, it implies that policy
makers endorse the full moral status argument. Yet, if this were the case, IVF should be
prohibited, as it routinely involves the creation and destruction of (surplus) embryos.
However, the embryo loss involved in IVF is generally accepted as justifiable in the
circumstances, an acceptable trade off given the benefits of assisted reproduction. Fur-
ther, it is questionable whether requiring the destruction of a ‘surplus’ embryo is less
morally problematic than allowing it to be donated for use in beneficial research. Sig-
nificantly, the current policy position does not prevent the loss of any ‘surplus’ embryos,
it merely prevents their use in research. It precludes research that may benefit other
individuals undergoing IVF and/or may prevent broader research, potentially undermin-
ing one of the purposes of the HART Act – to secure the benefits of ‘HRR’ for individ-
uals and society.121
Another highly problematic outcome of restricting research to ‘non-viable’ embryos
is that ECART has no capacity to approve research involving ‘viable’ embryos con-
ducted in the course of providing IVF,122 such as research into the effects of using
different embryo culture media on embryo development, implantation rates and preg-
nancy outcomes.123 In the context of a well-designed study, this kind of clinical research
is an important aspect of quality improvement. The implications of this are exemplified
by the recent attempt of local researchers to conduct a study into embryo transfer
practices.124
A case of regulatory failure: The day of transfer study
Embryo transfer, which involves the transfer of an IVF embryo to a woman’s uterus, is
an ‘established procedure’ under the Act, consequently it does not require ECART
approval but can be performed as a routine clinical procedure.125 In practice, fertility
providers may choose whether to transfer an embryo to a woman’s uterus on day three or
day five. In the proposed ‘Day of Transfer’ (DOT) study, researchers wished to compare
pregnancy and birth outcomes following different transfer times to obtain evidence as to
which had the better outcome in terms of improving pregnancy rates and neonatal out-
comes.126 The study, which excluded any women with fewer than four embryos who
might be disadvantaged if included, involved all women receiving standard care, but
120. F. Baylis, ‘The Ethics of Ex Utero Research on Spare “Non-viable” IVF Human Embryos’,
Bioethics 4(4) (1990), pp. 311–329.
121. Section 3(a).
122. NHMRC, Ethical Guidelines, cls. 17–17.9.
123. A. Sunde et al., ‘Time to Take Human Embryo Culture Seriously’, Human Reproduction
31(10) (2016), pp. 2174–2182.
124. L. Goodman et al., ‘The Futility of Fertility Research? Barriers to Embryo Research in New
Zealand’, New Zealand Medical Journal 131(1477) (2018), pp. 63–70.
125. HART Act, sections 3(e), 5 and 6; Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Order 2005,
cls. 4–5 and sch. 1 pt. 1.
126. Goodman et al., ‘Fertility Research’, p. 64.
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randomised whether they had a day three or day five transfer.127 To be clear, the study
intervention did not depart from standard practice but sought to better inform standard
practice.
‘HRR’ is defined in the HART Act as ‘research that uses . . . a human embryo’.128 On
the basis of legal advice obtained first from Health Legal (the legal arm of the Ministry of
Health) and then Crown Law, ECART declined the study, essentially because the
Research Guidelines only confers authority to approve research involving the use of
‘non-viable’ embryos. While this interpretation of ‘use’ may be reasonable given that the
DOT study was an interventional study, the implications of the restriction of research to
‘non-viable’ embryos is perverse. It prevents two procedures, where there is genuine
uncertainty as to which has the better outcome, from being compared, and thus prevents
the derivation of valuable clinical data.
In the event, the researcher questioned the interpretation adopted, requesting copies of the
legal opinion relied upon by ECART under the Official Information Act 1982 (OIA).129 The
Ministry declined the request on the basis that the legal opinions obtained were subject to
legal privilege,130 following which the researcher complained to the Ombudsman.131 After
investigation, Ombudsman Judge Peter Boshier concluded that the research proposed:132
is a matter of considerable public importance and interest. It seems to me that it is incumbent
on the Ministry to do everything it can to assist researchers adopt correct procedures and to
ensure that the best first hand information is made available. I can think of no plausible
reason why the Ministry would seek to withhold from a senior health researcher advice,
whether privileged legal advice or not, about the interpretation of a crucial term in the
governing legislation.
The Ombudsman noted that disclosing the legal opinions would
promote the accountability of the statutory decision maker, enable more effective partici-
pation by concerned or affected citizens in the administration of the HART Act and the
making of policies by ACART and thereby enhance respect for the law and to promote the
good government of New Zealand.133
The Ombudsman’s strong emphasis on ACART’s accountability to those subject to
regulatory restraint as a result of its embryo research policy is significant, but certainly
127. Op. cit.
128. Section 5 (emphasis added).
129. Section 12.
130. OIA, section 9(2)(h).
131. See Ombudsmen Act 1975, section 13.
132. Chief Judge P. Boshier, Opinion of Chief Ombudsman (Abridged) – Request for Legal
Opinions about a Key Term in Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2004 –
Public Interest in Access by a Senior Health Researcher Outweighs Legal Professional
Privilege (Office of the Ombudsman, Case No. 378663, 16 February 2016), para 47.
133. Boshier, Legal Opinions, paras 47 and 51.
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unsurprising. More surprising was the Ministry’s reluctance to release the legal advice in
the first place. There was little of note in the legal opinions, except a passing comment
made by Crown Law regarding ACART’s powers under the Act.
Crown Law noted that if ECART is unable to approve an activity because it is not
covered by a guideline, it must not only decline the application, it must also refer the
matter to ACART.134 However, what is most significant is the following, and manifestly
reasonable observation by Crown Law that after referring the matter to ACART ‘pre-
sumably the advisory committee may then give relevant advice or issue applicable
guidance’.135 As the following section explains, despite statutory provisions appearing
to delegate policymaking authority to ACART, there are significant barriers to ACART
discharging its obligations to provide advice, guidance and issue guidelines under
the Act.
Part III: ‘Interim’ Guidelines? A troubled regulatory relationship
A specific function of ACART is to provide the Minister with advice on issues arising
out of ‘ARPs’ and ‘HRR’ and, without limitation, advice as to whether a moratorium
should be imposed in relation to these activities.136 In addition, section 37(1) provides
that ACART must, within agreed time frames, provide information, advice and, if it
thinks fit, recommendations in relation to the use of embryos in ‘HRR’.137 Soon after it
was established, in 2005, ACART prioritised reviewing the Research Guidelines in its
work programme. In doing so, it partnered with the National Bioethics Council: Toi te
Taiao, a Government-appointed body which has since been disestablished.138
Given that Parliament empowers ACART with policymaking authority, extensive
consultation requirements are imposed to facilitate deliberative democracy.139 This
134. HART Act, section 18(2).
135. Letter from Crown Law to Health Legal regarding an application to perform ‘HRR’ under
the HART Act (HEA007/820, 18 February 2014) (obtained under OIA request to the
Ministry of Health).
136. Section 35(1)(b) (emphasis added).
137. This includes information, advice or recommendations pertaining to cloned embryos,
donations of human embryos, genetic modification of embryos, and hybrid embryos.
HART Act, section 37(1).
138. The Council was established by the government in 2002 and disestablished in 2009.
Available at: https://www.mfe.govt.nz/about-us/other-websites/closed-websites Closed
Websites (accessed 20 May 2020); The Council’s role, as declared on its website, was to
‘[p]rovide independent advice to Government on biotechnological issues involving
significant cultural, ethical and spiritual dimensions’, ‘[p]romote and participate in
public dialogue on cultural, ethical and spiritual aspects of biotechnology, and enable
public participation in the Council’s activities’ and ‘[p]rovide information on the
cultural, ethical and spiritual aspects of biotechnology’. Available at: http://ndhadeliver.
natlib.govt.nz/webarchive/wayback/20080422070746/http://www.bioethics.org.nz/about-
us/terms-of-ref-english.html Our Terms of Reference (accessed 20 May 2020).
139. ‘Deliberative democracy’ has been defined as ‘mutual communication that involves
weighing and reflecting on preferences, values, and interests regarding matters of
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reflects the view that in the case of controversial biotechnologies, regulators are required
to engage directly with the public, ensuring respect for the status of citizens as stake-
holders.140 Before giving significant advice under section 37 of the Act, ACART must
give interested parties and members of the public a reasonable opportunity to make
submissions and are required to take such submissions into account.141 When ACART
considers giving significant advice, it must undertake active public engagement and
enable public meetings to facilitate oral submissions if ACART believes a considerable
number of people would wish to do so.142 In addition, section 41 of the Act requires that,
before ACART gives advice to the Minister or issues guidelines to ECART, ACART
must ‘consult’ with any members of the public, government departments and agencies,
or any other person ACART considers appropriate. Further, before ACART issues
guidelines, it must ‘consult on the proposed guidelines with the Minister’.143
ACART commenced its review of the Research Guidelines in 2006, in partnership
with the Bioethics Council. In July 2006, the Bioethics Council published a booklet to
facilitate public dialogue about the use of human embryos in research: focusing on
cultural, ethical and spiritual aspects. In that same year, ACART released a public
consultation document inviting written submissions from the public.144 ACART also
conducted eight public meetings to receive oral submissions, including hui (to obtain the
views of Māori) and fono (to obtain the views of Pacifica peoples). This was supple-
mented by independent research commissioned by ACART, which utilised focus groups
to canvass the views of five particular groups: young people; women; people with
experience of infertility; people with experience of genetic disorders and Chinese and
Indian ethnic groups.145
ACART sought public views regarding the moral status of the embryo and what kind
of embryo research, if any, should be permitted in NZ including research involving basic
science, research into fertility and infertility, research into the prevention of hereditary
disease and research concerned with treating disease. For those participants who were
not opposed to embryo research, ACART sought views regarding what sources of
common concern’. See A. Bächtiger et al., eds., The Oxford Handbook of Deliberative
Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), p. 2.
140. R. Ankeny and S. Dodds, ‘Hearing Community Voices: Public Engagement in Australian
Human Embryo Research Policy, 2005–2007’, New Genetics and Society 27(3) (2008), p.
219. ‘Public engagement, stakeholder involvement, and the testing of competing arguments
for policy recommendations are each characteristic of an approach to democratic political
legitimacy that seeks to move beyond the purely formal processes characteristic of
aggregative democracy’.
141. HART Act, section 39(2).
142. Section 40.
143. Section 41(2).
144. ACART, Use of Gametes and Embryos in Human Reproductive Research: Determining
Policy for New Zealand: A Discussion Paper (December 2006).
145. Phoenix Research, Use of Gametes and Embryos in Human Reproductive Research:
Determining Policy for New Zealand: Research to Supplement Public Consultation on
ACART’s Discussion Document (April 2007).
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embryos were considered acceptable, with the options being ‘non-viable’ embryos;146
‘surplus’ embryos; and embryos created specifically for research, including hybrid
embryos and embryos created using IVF or therapeutic cloning via SCNT. ACART also
sought views about how Tikanga Māori (Māori cultural values) might apply to human
embryo research, as well as different ethical, spiritual and cultural perspectives held by
the public.
ACART received 345 written submissions. A further nine oral submissions were
heard at public meetings. Approximately 160 people attended the public consultation
meetings, including hui with Māori and fono with Pacific communities.147 Two broad
positions in relation to the use of embryos in research were identified in the submissions:
(a) complete opposition on the grounds that embryos are human life and any intervention
(including IVF) is akin to murder; and (b) support for some research ‘on the grounds that
they have a lesser moral status than persons who have been born, provided that such
research has scientific merit and potential to benefit human health’.148 In respect to
Māori views, the submissions reflected a wide range of attitudes to the use of embryos
in research. Overall, there was a sense that more time and a greater degree of engagement
at an iwi level (the wider kinship group) was needed to discuss the issues. Similar views
have been expressed in more recent discussions.149
In its analysis of submissions, ACART stated that it had ‘considered not only the
strength of public opinion, but also the strength of the arguments made’.150 ACART
subsequently provided the Minister with recommendations regarding reform and advice
regarding further work and consultation. However, there is no public record of ACART’s
recommendations to the Minister, nor has ACART commenced any further work in this
area. The destination of ACART’s advice can only be pieced together from snippets of
redacted information obtained under the OIA.
Ministerial mandate, or obstruction and obfuscation?
According to documents accessed under the OIA, ACART provided advice to
the Minister of Health in June 2007,151 proposing only modest immediate
146. ‘Non-viable’ embryos are defined as embryos that ‘do not have the potential to develop into
a foetus because of arrested growth, defects within the blastomeres, or poor morphology.
Analysis of their genetic component often reveals abnormalities in the chromosomes, which
are sometimes limited to only a small number of cells in an embryo’. ACART, Determining
Policy, para 55.
147. ACART, Use of Gametes and Embryos in Human Reproductive Research: Summary of
Submissions (September 2007).
148. ACART, Submissions, p. 2 (footnotes omitted).
149. M. Hudson et al., ‘Dialogue as a Method for Evolving Matauranga Maori Perspectives on
the Use of Embryos in Research’, AlterNative: An International Journal for Indigenous
Peoples 6(1) (2010), pp. 54–65.
150. ACART, Submissions, p. 1.
151. Specific advice from ACART to Pete Hodgson (Minister of Health) regarding ‘HRR’ (File
Ref.: AD20-86-6, 29 June 2007) (obtained under OIA request to the Ministry of Health).
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reform.152 It recommended the development of guidelines enabling the use of both
‘non-viable’ embryos and donated ‘surplus’ IVF embryos for research.153 It also
advised the Minister that guidelines should not permit the creation of embryos
specifically for research or the genetic modification of embryos in research – but
that these activities should be subject to an 18-month moratorium.154 Under the
Act, the Minister may recommend to the Governor General that an Order in
Council be passed declaring an activity to be subject to a moratorium, for up to
18 months, ‘for the purpose of allowing time for the development of advice or
guidelines, or both’.155 After a moratorium is imposed, ACART must agree on a
date with the Minister as to when it will provide the Minister with ‘information,
advice, and, if the committee thinks fit, recommendations’.156
ACART subsequently met with then Minister of Health, David Cunliffe and his
Associate Minister to discuss ACART’s recommendations in May 2008. The Minister
was clearly not receptive to ACART’s advice. Nevertheless in subsequent written cor-
respondence, ACART reiterated that it wanted to proceed with guideline development,
stating:157
. . . the [current] guidelines themselves do not reflect the values that New Zealanders have
told us are important to see implemented in the conduct of human reproductive research. I
would, therefore, like to begin work on new guidelines . . . Finally, ACART feels strongly
that it owes members of the public a response to the input they had as part of our consulta-
tion on embryo research . . . We would, therefore, like your agreement to publishing our
advice on embryo research on our website.
In a written response, Minister Cunliffe reinforced his complete rejection of
ACART’s advice, stating unequivocally that he ‘wished to see explicit prohibitions on
research using: donated surplus IVF embryos, hybrid embryos, genetically modified
embryos, [and] embryos specifically created for research purposes’.158 Further, he did
not agree to ACART publishing its advice on its website.159 The letter culminated with






157. Letter from Sylvia Rumball (ACART Chair) to Steve Chadwick (Associate Minister of
Health) regarding ACART’s work programme (3 June 2008) (obtained under OIA request
to the Ministry of Health).
158. Letter from David Cunliffe (Minister of Health) to Sylvia Rumball (ACART Chair)
regarding ACART’s advice to the Minister of Health (10 November 2008) (emphasis
added) (obtained under OIA request to the Ministry of Health).
159. Letter from David Cunliffe to Sylvia Rumball (obtained under OIA request to the Ministry
of Health).
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the Minister advising that after the imminent election he would be ‘seeking an urgent
meeting’ to discuss ACART’s ‘future advisory activities’.160
This exchange is concerning in several respects, primarily because it reflects a seem-
ing disregard for the statutory framework and the respective roles of ACART and the
Minister. While ACART has statutory obligations to ‘consult’ the Minister, its primary
statutory obligations are in regard to developing policy advice and guidelines in accor-
dance with the purposes and principles of the Act. In developing its advice and recom-
mendations, ACART clearly discharged its obligations to consider the HART Act
principles and undertake public consultation. While the Minister may not have liked
ACART’s advice, it was made in accordance with the statutory provisions.
Although the Minister may not agree, there is arguably no statutory mandate for the
Minister to simply reject ACART advice, certainly not without explanation or justifica-
tion. More importantly, the Act does not confer a Ministerial power to unilaterally
demand ACART introduce certain prohibitions, particularly when such a prohibition
is inconsistent with what, after undertaking substantial consultation, ACART considers
appropriate. While the Minister’s demand that ACART introduces explicit prohibitions
on the use of certain types of embryos was simply ultra vires it was, in any event, it was
unnecessary. The effect of the Research Guidelines is that they prevent the very activ-
ities that the Minister wished to see explicitly prohibited. If a particular type of ‘HRR’ is
not permitted by the Research Guidelines, ECART cannot approve it, and by default it
cannot be lawfully performed.
That said, the Act clearly requires ACART to ‘consult’ with the Minister prior to
issuing significant advice, or guidelines to ECART.161 Although the Act does not define
‘consult’, the common law approach adopted by the High Court in Air New Zealand
Limited v Wellington International Airport Ltd is applicable.162 When considering the
nuances of a statutory duty to ‘consult’, McGechan J observed that the essence of
‘consult’ is ‘not merely to tell or present. Nor, at the other extreme, is it to agree.
Consultation does not necessarily involve negotiation toward an agreement, although
the latter not uncommonly can follow’.163 In other words, consulting is the ‘statement of
a proposal not yet finally decided upon, listening to what others have to say, considering
their responses and then deciding what will be done’.164
Although the purpose of the statutory consultation requirements is to impose con-
straint on ACART, this arguably does not equate to providing the Minister with a power
of veto. On the face of the Act, ACART has authority to give advice and to issue
guidelines, provided it has discharged its statutory obligations. This approach is
160. Op. cit.
161. Section 41(2).
162. Air New Zealand Ltd v Wellington International Airport Ltd HC Wellington CP403/91,
6 January 1992 per McGechan J.
163. Air New Zealand Ltd v Wellington International Airport Ltd, at 8 per McGechan J.
164. Air New Zealand Ltd v Wellington International Airport Ltd, at 8 per McGechan J citing
West Coast United Council v Prebble (1988) 12 NZTPA 399 (HC) at 405.
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strengthened by the purpose of the Act, which is to provide a ‘robust and flexible
framework’,165 and to delegate policymaking authority and ethical review to two stat-
utory bodies.166
Not only is it arguable that the Minister exceeded his statutory power in vetoing
ACART’s recommendations and demanding express prohibitions, also troubling is the
Minister’s obfuscation of ACART’s advice by refusing to agree to ACART publishing
its advice on its website. This lack of transparency undermines the objectives of the Act,
specifically establishing a robust, flexible framework, and fails to ensure transparency
and accountability of regulators to the public.
Options for ACART
As a result of the current impasse, NZ’s embryo research policy which has not been
legally effective since 2007 continues to prevent potentially valuable embryo research,
despite ACART’s efforts to review it. It is arguable that ACART could, despite minis-
terial opposition, publish its advice on its website and proceed with developing and
consulting on new embryo research guidelines. As noted above, apart from the consulta-
tion obligations, the Act does not require that the Minister agree with advice or approve
ACART’s guidelines. The Act simply requires that, following the mandatory consulta-
tion, when issuing guidelines ACART must give copies to the Minister, the Director-
General of Health, ECART and providers and publish the guidelines on the Internet.167
The Act states that as ‘soon as practicable’ after receiving a copy of the guidelines, the
Minister must present a copy to the House of Representatives.168
This statutory power does not mean, however, that guidelines issued by ACART
under the HART Act should not be subject to external oversight and scrutiny. It is a
core democratic principle that any delegation of Parliament’s lawmaking power should
be subject to review. However, this requires determining how the Research Guidelines
should be characterised in the legislative and regulatory landscape.
External scrutiny: Constraints on ACARTs power to issue guidelines
A variety of terms may be used in relation to the products of lawmaking powers that are
delegated under an empowering Act, for example, a ‘regulation’, a ‘code’, a by-law or an
‘order in council’, all of which fall under the umbrella concept of ‘delegated’ or ‘sub-
ordinate’ or ‘secondary’ legislation.169 While not specified on the face of the HART Act,
it is arguable that the Research Guidelines fall within the category of subordinate
legislation referred to in the Legislation Act 2012 (LA) as a ‘disallowable instrument’.170
165. Section 3(d).
166. Sections 3(e), 27–28, 32 and 35.
167. Section 36(2).
168. Section 36(3).
169. McGee, Parliamentary Practice, p. 461.
170. LA, section 38(1)(c).
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A ‘disallowable instrument’ is subject to the House of Representatives power to disallow (or
amend, revoke or replace),171 enabling the House of Representatives to supervise Parliament’s
delegations of lawmaking power.172 The LA deems an instrument made under an enactment to
be ‘disallowable’ if it fulfils one or more of three criteria.173 One criterion is that the instrument
has a ‘significant legislative effect’.174 The LA specifies that an instrument has a ‘significant
legislative effect’ if the effect of the instrument is to both ‘create, alter, or remove rights or
obligations’ and ‘determine or alter the content of the law applying to the public or a class of the
public’.175 The Research Guidelines clearly satisfy this definition: they create legal obligations
for researchers and providers, which are statutorily enforced by a penalty if a person breaches
the guidelines.176 Further, by establishing the lawful scope of embryo research, the guidelines
determine the law applying to fertility service providers, patients and researchers.177 There is
undoubtedly a strong case for finding the Research Guidelines fall within the category of
secondary legislation referred to as disallowable instruments in the LA. However, proposed
new legislation that seeks to simplify and remove uncertainty regarding the boundaries of
secondary legislation by clearly identifying secondary legislation does not (as yet) expressly
include the HART Act Guidelines.178 While this is likely an oversight, it creates residual
uncertainty as to whether the Research Guidelines constitute delegated legislation.
If ACART were to issue new guidelines, the Minister is required to present them in
the House, even if he does not endorse them.179 However, if there are concerns regarding
the guidelines, and if it is accepted that they constitute a disallowable instrument, they
may be referred to the Regulations Review Committee. The Regulations Review Com-
mittee may review ‘disallowable instruments’, but it focuses on procedural issues rather
than the substantive content/policy of subordinate legislation.180 Alternatively, Parlia-
ment’s Standing Orders give subject select committees, including the Health Select
Committee, power to initiate an inquiry into subject matter that falls within their terms
of reference.181 Hence, it would be open to the Health Select Committee to undertake a
171. LA, sections 42–46.
172. R. Carter, ‘Disallowable Instruments’, New Zealand Law Journal 6 (2014), p. 236.
173. Section 38(1).
174. LA, section 38(1)(c).
175. Sections 39(1)–39(2).
176. HART Act, Sections 16–17, 23, 26, 45–50, 52–57 and 60–61.
177. Section 39(3) of the LA Act provides that the description, form and maker of the instrument
must be disregarded when determining if an instrument is an ‘ISLE’: hence the core issue in
determining whether the guidelines constitute an ISLE is whether they alter rights and
obligations.
178. See the Secondary Legislation Bill which applies in tandem with the Legislation Act 2019.
Although it has received Royal Assent, the Legislation Act 2019 will only come into force
when the Secondary Legislation Bill is enacted.
179. HART Act, section 36.
180. The Regulations Review Committee may review ‘disallowable instruments’, but it focuses
on procedural issues rather than the substantive content/policy of subordinate legislation.
See McGee, Parliamentary Practice p. 461.
181. Standing Orders of the House of Representatives 2017, SO 189(2).
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review of any tabled guidelines. Following review, it may recommend to the House of
Representatives that a resolution be passed to disallow any provision(s).182 This would
provide a formal oversight mechanism for any guidelines issued by ACART that do not
have the support of the Minister.
While this option, which depends upon the Research Guidelines being deemed to be a
‘disallowable instrument’/secondary legislation is potentially available to ACART, for-
cing the issue in this way may not be a particularly attractive or feasible option. The
Minister appoints, and has the power to terminate, ACART members.183 In addition,
ACART is not well resourced. It is dependent upon limited secretariat support and
funding from the Ministry of Health. Consequently, ACART has sought agreement from
the Minister when formulating its work programme. Given this relationship, it would be
understandable if ACART wished to avoid antagonising the Minister. However, it
remains that ACART’s primary obligations under the Act are to patients, providers and
the public in general.184 Clearly, this would be an easier task for ACART if it were
established as an arm’s length body similar to the UK’s HFEA, with independent
resources. While this analysis has suggested that the HART Act does not empower the
Minister to dictate ACART policy, it must also be acknowledged that there are features
of the regulatory environment that affect ACART’s ability to act independently, includ-
ing resource issues and a lack of will across the political spectrum to prioritise the issue
of embryo research.
The impasse between the Minister and ACART has never been resolved. Since its
early efforts, ACART has unsuccessfully sought approval from consecutive Ministers to
revisit the issue of embryo research. After a National-led coalition government was
formed in 2008, Tony Ryall replaced David Cunliffe as Minister of Health. ACART,
once again, sought agreement to commence a review of embryo research, but it was
never obtained.185 In 2014, ACART noted in its briefing to Jonathan Coleman, the
incoming Minister, that reviewing the Research Guidelines was a ‘priority item’ in
regard to its work programme, subject to ministerial agreement, which again did not
eventuate.186 In 2017, a Labour-led coalition government was formed, with a majority
Labour government following elections in 2020 . As yet no announcements have been
made regarding review of the Research Guidelines.
182. The LA authorises the House of Representatives, by resolution, to disallow any provision of
a ‘disallowable instrument’, sections 42(1),(2). The LA Act 2019, s 116 similarly allows the
House to disallow, by resolution, any secondary legislation or provision therein.
183. HART Act, sections 34(1)–34(3).
184. See HART Act, sections 3–4, 34–36 and 39–41.
185. Letter from Tony Ryall (Minister of Health) to Sylvia Rumball (ACART Chair) regarding
consent to review the Research Guidelines (10 September 2009) (obtained under OIA
request to the Ministry of Health).
186. ACART, Briefing to the Incoming Minister of Health (10 November 2014), pp. 7 and 9–10.
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Conclusion
This article makes two distinct claims. First, that the policy contained in the Research
Guidelines is insufficiently justified and substantively flawed, with adverse conse-
quences for research and the provision of fertility services. Second, that while the HART
Act’s principles-based framework may be superficially appealing, the current regulatory
environment fails to enable the core regulatory values of procedural legitimacy, effec-
tiveness, transparency and accountability of regulators.187 Despite the deficiencies of the
Research Guidelines and repeated attempts by ACART to engage with this issue, suc-
cessive Ministers have actively prevented policy review in this area.
On the face of it, NZ’s HART Act establishes a flexible, but protective, regulatory
framework, introducing specific prohibitions in regard to embryo research,188 but oth-
erwise delegates policy development, in the form of advice and guidelines, to
ACART.189 By permitting IVF to be performed routinely, and by endorsing the
‘14-day rule’ in primary legislation, NZ has implicitly adopted a nuanced or gradualist
approach to the embryo. Despite the fact that the HART Act seeks to facilitate flexible,
principles-based regulation, outdated Research Guidelines made prior to the introduction
of the Act remain in use. Yet is is trite that when regulating modern technologies,
regulators may be called to account if the regulatory objectives being pursued are not
perceived to be ethically legitimate; if regulatory interventions are ineffective in prac-
tice; or if regulation fails to appropriately connect to a regulatory target.190 This analysis
suggests that while the regulatory objectives set out in the HART Act are defensible, they
are not being achieved in practice, and regulators are failing to meet required standards.
The current policy that narrowly restricts embryo research adopts an extremely con-
servative position on the ethical spectrum that is difficult to reconcile with the purposes
and principles of the HART Act. Arguably, demonstrating respect for human embryos as
a form of human life does not require treating them as inviolable, prohibiting all embryo
research. Demonstrating respect for human life does not preclude their use in significant
and beneficial research. Rather, it requires careful regulation regarding their use. Further,
restricting research to ‘non-viable’ embryos does not prevent the destruction of any
embryos, and it comes at significant cost to beneficial research. A recent survey provides
evidence that New Zealand researchers would, if legally permitted, conduct research into
improving fertility rates and/or increasing understanding of embryo biology.191 Ulti-
mately, fertility service patients, and society in general, are denied the benefits that may
be derived from embryo research.
187. Legislation Design and Advisory Committee, Legislation Guidelines (Wellington, NZ,
LDAC, 2018), ch 14.
188. HART Act, sections 8–10, 11–16, 25–26, 51 and 62.
189. HART Act, sections 35 and 37–38.
190. R. Brownsword and M. Goodwin, Law and the Technologies of the Twenty-First Century
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 46.
191. Goodman et al., ‘Fertility Research’, p. 67.
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In a pluralist and largely secular society, individual views may differ as to what
kind of research should be permissible. However, at a minimum, fertility service
providers should be able to conduct well-designed clinical research into fertility
treatment. To prevent such research is to prevent the development of good quality
services. This predominantly disadvantages the women who undergo, and children
born as a result of, IVF procedures, contrary to the purposes and principles of the
HART Act. Significantly, couples/individuals who have completed their reproduc-
tive treatment are denied a choice as to how their embryos will be disposed of when
embryo storage limits expire. It is reasonable to suggest that couples who must
decide the fate of their stored ‘surplus’ embryos should be able to decide whether
they are simply destroyed or used for research purposes. To require a disposition
decision to be made, but to limit it to destruction, simply cannot be justified when
alternatives exist.
It is certainly true that embryo research exists on a spectrum in terms of the type of
research that may be performed and the type of embryos that may be used. These are the
very questions that ACART is mandated to explore under the HART Act. However,
despite appearing to have considerable authority under the Act, it is clear that ACART is
subject to ministerial control. This article has identified a concerning pattern of obstruc-
tion and obfuscation, preventing ACART from discharging it statutory duties, and ulti-
mately undermining the effectiveness, transparency and accountability of ACART as
regulators.
In practice, ACART lacks independence, and the issue of embryo research remains
politicised. ACART, by seeking agreement from consecutive Ministers to proceed with
the review of the guidelines governing embryo research, appears to have ceded control to
the Minister. These problems are compounded by the fact that, due to the expiry of the
interim period, the current Research Guidelines are no longer legally effective. This
results in two things: ACART failing to discharge its statutory obligations by not review-
ing guidelines that it considers are inadequate192 and wrongly suggesting that the
Minister has statutory authority over ACART.
Ultimately, it is apparent that the HART Act is not functioning as intended, a problem
that extends beyond the regulation of human embryo research. Given this it is arguable
that, in the interests of transparency, accountability and regulatory legitimacy in general,
the HART Act should be reformed and Parliament should assume direct responsibility
for determining these matters.
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